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Introduction 
Unbelievably, it has been more than 15 years since I last visited Palacký during the 
inaugural year of its Clinic. So, in preparation for today’s talk, I thought I should go 
back to my files to refresh my memory of events a decade-and-a-half ago.  As I 
reviewed those documents, it struck me how the events of that time were much more 
complicated than I initially remembered.  In fact, I saw how my retelling of the events 
reflected in those papers could be constructed – with appropriate spin -- into different 
stories -- some of which could be dramatically divergent from others. 
When we teach our students legal storytelling, we show them how lawyers can filter 
out certain details in their cases and focus on others to craft a compelling narrative for 
one party or the other.  Using this approach in describing my Palacký Clinic file, I 
could tinker with the evidence in it and craft multiple narratives. 
So to begin my presentation at this conference, I thought that instead of addressing 
complex law teaching in the abstract, I would start more concretely -- to tackle the 
subject by sharing with you two very divergent tales that can be woven about the 
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establishment of the Palacký Clinic.  Perhaps consideration of these stories will help 
to give us some insights on the problems faced in addressing the difficult issues raised 
by complex law teaching. 
So let us begin this morning’s story hour with my first narrative:  I entitle it, Clinical 
Education Comes to Central Europe:  Hofstra’s and Palacký’s Partnership in Training 
Law Students in the Practice of Public Interest Law.  Our narrative begins after the 
1989 Velvet Revolution when Palacký’s rector Josef Jarab sought to establish a law 
school at the University to train a new generation of lawyers for practice in a 
democratic legal system dedicated to the rule of law.  Soon thereafter, Rector Jarab 
fortuitously met Hofstra Professor Richard Neumann at a conference in New York, 
and a fruitful relationship was created between Hofstra School of Law and Palacký. 
Five years later, the two schools began to explore the development of a clinical 
program at Palacký.  Seeking funding for the new project, the schools jointly applied 
for a Ford Foundation grant to establish a live-client Housing Rights Clinic, patterned 
after my own Clinic at Hofstra.  In the United States in the 1960s, Ford had been 
instrumental in spearheading efforts to integrate clinical education into mainstream 
law school curricula.  Now, thirty years later, it was hoped that Ford would assist the 
development of clinical education in law schools in the newly democratized Eastern 
Bloc. 
With the overall goal of helping democracy succeed in the Czech Republic, the grant 
application listed four goals: i)  to demonstrate to citizens on the ground in the Czech 
Republic that concrete actions using the legal mechanisms of a democratic state could 
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lead to the rule of law; ii) to train students in the importance and skills of practicing 
law in the public interest; iii) to create a model law school clinic, which other law 
schools in the region could emulate to expand the training of public interest lawyers; 
and iv) to heighten the legal consciousness of government officials, present and future. 
Ford approved this application, and in early 1996, this ambitious project began.  
Pursuant to the grant, Palacký hired an experienced Olomouc commercial law 
attorney as a clinical teacher to establish the Clinic. Early in 1996, she visited my Clinic 
to learn methods of clinical teaching and observe my students in action handling cases 
-- in the law office and courts. Returning to Olomouc, this clinician established a Clinic 
in fall, 1996. 
Palacký created a law office with its own computer with Internet access. Ten students 
enrolled in the Clinic and enthusiastically began to work on a variety of cases -- an 
eviction case by a landlord who wanted to have his daughter live in the flat; a marital 
dispute over the right to a flat; a town's attempts to evict a tenant.  For these cases, 
students interviewed clients, drafted memos, and wrote letters to clients and 
adversaries. Based on her experiences at Hofstra, the clinician developed creative 
seminar classes focused on ethical issues and client relationships.  In these seminars, 
students also had the opportunity to engage in simulated arguments of court cases. 
In fall, 1996 and then spring, 1997, I visited the Clinic.  I was deeply impressed with 
the students’ commitment to their clients and their command of the cases.  The 
clinician was a natural teacher and had a warm relationship with her students. I had 
some good meetings with the Dean and other law school administrators, imbibed 
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slivovitz (your wonderful plum brandy) with them, and shared my thoughts about 
the program. 
While Ford decided not to refund the program, the work of that year laid the 
foundation for the vibrant clinical program now existing at Palacký under the 
wonderful leadership of Maxim Tomoszek. 
Now let me tell you my second yarn:  The Bumpy Road: Unrealistic Expectations Confront 
a Newly Democratic Legal System.  This story begins much the same as our first tale -- 
the development of the relationship between Hofstra and Palacký; the application to 
Ford and its approval; and Palacký's hiring of a clinician. At this point, however, the 
two narratives diverge quite dramatically. 
The grant was approved, and in early 1996, the Palacký clinician visited my Clinic at 
Hofstra.  She enjoyed the seminar component of the class and supervisory sessions 
with the students.  But she was very frustrated with the court appearances.  My 
students' cases were in several courts -- lower state trial courts and federal court.  But 
every time, after the students prepared for a hearing, when we appeared in court, after 
hours of waiting, the cases were adjourned to another date.  As her stay in the United 
States concluded, she stopped going to court hearings questioning the benefit of all 
this student preparation with the only payoff being delay. 
In fall, 1996, the clinician started the Palacký clinic with ten students and eventually 
each two-student team had one client to represent.   When I visited Olomouc in 
December, 1996, I was very impressed with the students' commitment to their clients 
and the clinician's talents as a teacher.  I did, however, express two concerns:  (1) the 
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law school had made no attempt to obtain approval for student practice in the courts; 
and (2) no referral network had been created for developing a stream of low-income 
clients for the Clinic.  As to the first issue, the law school responded that the Czech 
Bar and Courts were strongly resistant to any student practice.  In regard to the second 
issue, the clinician said she was attempting to get more cases referred.  All in all, 
though, as I returned home, I felt fairly positive about the prospects for the Clinic. 
But when I returned in May, 1997, I got a different feeling.  Very few new cases had 
been taken.   In all my meetings with students, they were still enthusiastic about the 
first opportunity in the words of one student, "to feel like a lawyer," but they were 
very frustrated with the fact that the Clinic had so few cases and that they could not 
argue in court.  Many of the students and the clinician emphatically told me they 
wanted to be able to accept cases from any possible client, not just poor people. 
While my meetings with the administration five months earlier had been upbeat, this 
time around, the mood was cordial but cool. While I continued to applaud the 
clinician’s teaching methods and seminar classes, I expressed dismay at the lack of 
movement on the issues of student practice and the development of referral resources 
for needy clients.  The administration was adamant that both the Czech Bar and 
judiciary were dead set against student practice and that the limitation on the types of 
clients which could be accepted by the Clinic only stood in the way of the development 
of a vibrant clinical program. 
I kept referring to my experiences in America.  And the response could be 
encapsulated by the comment of one of the participants at the meeting, “In the Czech 
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Republic, things must be gradual.” 
I reported to Ford, and the foundation decided to terminate the grant. 
                                                               ************** 
I am not relating these two stories to you because I believe one is more truthful than 
the other.  Each of them is based on facts reflected in my notes from 15 years ago. And 
certainly, as a guest of your wonderful law school, my intent in telling these two tales 
is not to cast aspersions on Palacký nor its administration or faculty, nor for that matter 
Hofstra, Ford, or myself. 
All of the participants acted in good faith, with the best of intentions, and with great 
passion.  There is no doubt that in that one year, the students, faculty, and 
administration of Palacký took great strides in starting the process of the development 
of experiential education in the Czech Republic and that those efforts sowed the seeds 
for the strong clinical program that now exists fifteen years later.  
But, at least in my opinion, primarily retelling the first story and disregarding the 
second has profound consequences. Quite honestly, I love to tell people the first tale.  
It emotionally makes me feel quite successful about my work with your law school.  
But, if we want to be honest about what actually happened, we cannot ignore the 
second tale.  In fact, that story has some significant takeaways from which we can 
learn a great deal:  about the tensions, for example, between the cultural perspectives 
of American legal educators and their Czech counterparts; about both the benefits and 
limitations of outside influence in the development of law schools in newly-
democratized countries; and the different roles of skills training and social justice in 
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experiential education.  
As heartwarming as it may be to sit over a couple of drinks and share the first story 
with you, nuance is lost.  It is only through the messy details of the second tale that 
we are able to gain some insights into how we can improve complex legal education. 
Use of Persuasion and Inquiring Modes 
Unfortunately, too much of the current literature on experiential legal education has 
the attributes of my first tale – moving essays which are not necessarily grounded in 
a critical examination of the messy details. 
A good example of this storytelling approach to issues in experiential legal education 
is the treatment of an empirical study I conducted a few years ago on the effectiveness 
of clinical legal education.2  In that study, I compared the legal reasoning strategies 
used in solving a legal problem by different groups of students at the University of 
Chicago Law School:  second-year students who had not enrolled in a clinic; third-
year students who had not taken a clinic; and third-year students who had been 
enrolled in a clinical program.  When it came to the issue of the effectiveness of clinical 
training, my findings were mixed. I found that – at least in terms of these particular 
groups -- those subjects who had enrolled in a clinic outpaced their nonclinical 
counterparts in identifying client interests and the next steps to take in the case. But I 
also discovered that participation in a clinic may not lead to better proficiency in fact 
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35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 359 (2008). 
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analysis or identification of relevant rules. 
Surprisingly, despite these mixed findings, several of the subsequent articles which 
cite this study disregard or downplay the findings that are negative about clinical 
education and suggest that my study shows overall benefits of clinical experience.  
One article, for example, argues, “The benefits of moving from the traditional 
passivity of the Socratic dialogue to adding experience to doctrinal courses via 
simulation exercises are myriad.  In fact, this hypothesis has been tested empirically.”3  
The authors then cite my article with a parenthetical stating that the study 
“conclude[s] that students who participated in experiential education activities in law 
school were better able to identify some relevant facts in a legal fact pattern, identify 
legal rules relevant to a client's problem, identify client interests, and consider next 
steps in a client representation.”  Apparently, because it would undercut their overall 
argument, the authors say nothing whatsoever about the more negative findings.  In 
another article touting the benefits of experiential legal education, the authors cite the 
study to recite the same list of the purported superior performances by clinical subjects 
but then hide the mixed results in a footnote.4 
Another example in this storytelling genre about experiential legal education, is a 
significant – and much heralded – recent report on American legal education by a 
                                                 
3 Lisa T. McElroy & Christine N. Coughlin, Failure is Not an Option:  An Essay on What Legal Educators 
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509 n.25 (2010).  
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Signature Pedagogy in the Law School Curriculum, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 361, 397-98  (2010). 
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major clinical educators association, Best Practices for Legal Education.5  In it, the authors 
review one-sided polemics in support of experiential education.  And then conclude 
the tale with the bald assertion: 
We encourage law schools to follow the lead of other professional schools and transform 
their programs of instruction so that the entire educational experience is focused on 
providing opportunities to practice solving problems under supervision in an academic 
environment. This is the most effective and efficient way to develop professional 
competence. 
The authors of this report apparently saw no need to consider research contrary to 
their preconceived conclusion or even to tone down the language to recognize that a 
valid counter-narrative might exist. 
The type of storytelling reflected in these articles and Best Practices, by its very nature, 
falls into the category of what Robert Condlin calls the use of persuasion mode.  
Condlin posits that two types of reasoning are at the core of an attorney’s work: 
persuasion mode and learning mode.  In persuasion mode, the lawyer tries to 
manipulate a situation to achieve a particular goal. A lawyer in persuasion mode tends 
to act more or less based on strategic motives. She minimizes any self analysis, 
tentativeness, doubt, or perplexity over the unknowable and gray areas of her cases.  
In learning – or what I will call inquiring mode – the lawyer’s reasoning is open ended. 
She follows her curiosity and interest in exploring things regardless of consequences. 
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A lawyer in inquiring mode is not trying to accomplish anything except to learn more 
about a subject.6 
Obviously, effective attorneys need to use and function well with both modes of 
reasoning. In interviewing, counseling, and mediation, for example, use of the 
inquiring mode may be crucial to understanding the complete picture of what has 
occurred in a dispute or what a party seeks to obtain in a particular transaction. But 
in other arenas – such as trial work or adversarial negotiation -- persuasion mode is 
usually the most effective means of attaining a client’s goals. 
Applying Condlin’s model to our own work on complex legal education, it is clear 
that storytelling in the persuasion mode can be very beneficial to those of us who are 
committed to experiential legal education.  Our field is a relatively new movement.  
From its inception, some traditional legal academics have been quite hostile to the 
notion that practice-based learning should have had any role in law schools.  In 
America – and elsewhere in the world – many clinical and skills teachers have been 
deprived of comparable compensation with other law professors, have been denied 
full participation in governance of their institutions, and remain in second-class status. 
Given this context, it is quite natural that teachers in the field of experiential legal 
education have been prone to use persuasion mode. We have a strategic goal:  to 
persuade our colleagues and institutions of the value of our pedagogy and to become 
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Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1981). 
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full-fledged members of the legal academic community. And to achieve that goal, we 
sometimes filter out damaging facts and gloss over doubts and perplexities in regard 
to the unknowable and gray areas of the case we are making.   
But I believe that for a movement that is now half a century old, it is high time that we 
start to refocus our energies from persuasion to inquiring mode.  Obviously, we 
should not sell ourselves short, especially in situations in which others in the legal 
academy want to shut the door on our status and pedagogy. But, at least in my 
opinion, we need to step back from our storytelling.  In inquiring mode, we need to 
critically examine our teaching methods, the relative roles of experiential and other 
forms of legal instruction, and the impact of our teaching on our graduates years into 
practice. 
We should explore these issues regardless of the consequences – even if, for example, 
we find that other types of pedagogy are beneficial throughout legal training or that 
some of our methods and approaches are simply counterproductive. I believe it is time 
for us to abandon our shibboleths and familiar narratives.  We need to engage in the 
type of rigorous inquiry that will help us to improve not only our contributions to 
context-based learning but also to legal education as a whole. 
 Four hundred years ago, the influential reformer Jan Amos Komensky traveled 
these parts challenging prevailing educational theories and advocating the use of new 
teaching methods.  In Komensky’s spirit, I hope that we can also challenge prevailing 
theories in our field in order to develop more effective methods for educating our 
students. 
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So, for the remainder of this presentation, I would like to give a critique of some of the 
trendy stories in experiential legal education these days and raise some questions 
about their validity.  Before I begin, however, I want to make clear; I am not calling 
for a total rejection of these narratives. Just as there is some truth to my first story 
today about the Palacký Clinic, there is some validity in the stories I will be discussing.  
They have some important points to make.  My point, however, is that the evidence 
supporting these narratives is not as clear-cut as some of those storytellers would like 
to believe. I submit that we should be willing and eager to explore all the evidence – 
both pro and con – in regard to the tales now being told in our field. 
Tale 1:  The Practical Apprenticeship Model:  the Vehicle for 21st Century Legal 
Education 
The first story I would like to address can be entitled, The Practical Apprenticeship 
Model:  the Vehicle for 21st Century Legal Education.7 
This story has been at the forefront of recent efforts for changes in legal education by 
many in the American experiential legal education community. The source of this 
narrative was the 2007 Carnegie Report on Legal Education – Educating Lawyers:  
Preparation for the Profession of Law.8  It has generated numerous favorable articles; an 
array of conferences on how best to implement its recommendations; and the creation 
                                                 
7 For a full discussion of the issues raised in this section, see Stefan H. Krieger & Serge Martinez, 
Performance Isn’t Everything: The Importance of Conceptual Competence in Outcome Assessment of 
Experiential Learning, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 251 (2012). 
8 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN et al., EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW (2007). 
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of law school committees throughout the United States on Carnegie reform. 
Unfortunately, however, very few scholars have sat back and given the Report the 
critical analysis it requires. 
One of the primary recommendations of the Report is increased emphasis on what it 
calls the “practical apprenticeship.” Attempting to adapt the traditional legal 
apprenticeship model to present-day legal education, the Report calls for studying the 
performance of experts to distill and simplify their techniques.  These are the expert’s 
toolkit.  Then based on those techniques, we should teach students “scaffolds” for 
practice:   “the rules, protocols, and organizing metaphors for approaching situations 
or problems.” 
A scaffold could be, for example, a particular interviewing procedure, a protocol 
for problem solving, a technique for negotiating a deal, or a method for drafting a 
contract. In the Carnegie model, increased competence comes as a student gradually 
accumulates a “toolkit of well-founded procedures” in different areas of legal practice. 
Within this performance framework, “the prime learning task of the novice in law is 
to achieve a basic acquaintance with the common techniques of the lawyer’s craft.” 
According to Carnegie, then, the primary focus of experiential education should 
be on performance:  repeated experiences in which students use expert techniques. In 
this approach, student reasoning takes a backseat to learning these techniques. In fact, 
Carnegie argues that reasoning and attention to context by novice learners is 
unhelpful; instead, it posits that students should be taught to “recognize certain well-
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defined elements of the situation and apply precise and formal rules to these elements, 
regardless of what else is happening.” 
Carnegie’s story may at first glance seem very enticing to those of us who are 
committed to context-based learning.  In fact, it has been wildly acclaimed by many 
in the American clinical community.  The crucial problem underlying Carnegie’s focus 
on performance, however, is that it does not rest on a sound theoretical or empirical 
foundation. 
Carnegie’s Reliance on the Dreyfus Theory 
Carnegie’s theory of expert training is based entirely on the work of two brothers, 
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, educated respectively as a philosopher and an engineer. 
The Dreyfus brothers posit that expertise is simply a matter of pattern recognition. 
They argue, for example, that we are able to ride bikes because of prior experiences 
operating them, not because we are engaging in some kind of cognitive process. As 
they observe, “No detached choice or deliberation occurs. It just happens, apparently 
because the proficient performer has experienced similar situations in the past and 
memories of them trigger plans similar to those that worked in the past and 
anticipation of events similar to those that occurred.”9 They argue, “Normally, experts 
do not solve problems and do not make decisions; they do what normally works.” 
With this theoretical outlook, the Dreyfuses assert that acquisition of this kind of 
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Expertise in the Era of the Computer 28 (1986). 
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expert intuition requires the novice to learn protocols and strategies for identifying 
the facts and features of a particular situation and performing in response to these 
facts. They assert that novices progress through different stages of accumulated 
experience.  These stages of development, the Dreyfuses claim, reflect an evolution 
from the abstract toward the concrete, “from … following abstract rules, to involved 
skilled behavior based on accumulation of concrete experiences and the unconscious 
recognition of new situations similar to whole remembered ones.”   In the Dreyfuses’ 
own words, as students become experts, they act “arationally.” In other words, expert 
performance is essentially mindless. Accordingly, under the Dreyfus approach, 
expertise is not reflected as much in cognitive competencies as in mindless 
performances responding to perceived situations. 
Consistent with Dreyfus, Carnegie envisions that students should first learn rules, 
strategies, methods, and protocols to enable them to recognize patterns and perform 
in particular situations. Following Dreyfus, the Report contends that after numerous 
experiences, students progress through stages and acquire expertise. As they develop 
expertise, they stop relying on abstract rules and instead respond unconsciously to 
new situations by perceiving similarities to whole, remembered past experiences. 
From this perspective, a student’s action, rather than her reasoning process, has 
paramount importance. 
1. Cognitive science critique of Dreyfus 
Cognitive science research challenges the Dreyfus expertise theory and suggests a 
much different approach to training for expertise. Most cognitive scientists do 
REFLECTION – TEACHING AND LEARNING IN CLINIC 
261 
 
recognize the role that pattern recognition plays in expert performance. Nonetheless, 
they reject the notion that intuitive pattern recognition alone is determinative of expert 
performance.  
In fact, the Dreyfus theory conflicts with a number of empirical findings on expert 
decision making. First, contrary to the Dreyfus theory, studies show that in many 
domains requiring complex problem solving, expertise does not produce a decrease 
in abstract thought and a concurrent increase in concrete thinking. Indeed, in these 
domains, experts have been found to analyze problems at a deeper, more abstract level 
than nonexperts.10 
Second, the existence of progressive stages in expert development is not supported by 
the evidence. The Dreyfus theory suggests that the more experience individuals have 
in a particular area, the more intuition they acquire, and the more expertise they gain. 
Studies have shown, however, that those individuals with extensive experience in a 
field do not necessarily perform better than people with less training.  In fact, the 
number of years of experience in a field is a poor predictor of attained performance.11 
Many of us know lawyers who have practiced for decades who simply have not 
developed expertise in a field. 
Finally, neuroscience evidence does not support the notion of similarity 
recognition in complex problem solving. This research demonstrates that complex 
                                                 
10 See Krieger, supra note 6, at 265. 
11 Id. 
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decision making entails a rich connection of different neural subsystems (explicit and 
implicit) and an interplay between them.12 
In contrast to the Dreyfus pattern recognition theory, cognitive scientists contend 
that, in fact, experts do use particular cognitive processes in their decision making. 
These processes are not always conscious and deliberate. Rather, they reflect the 
interaction between implicit and explicit knowledge. Complex decision making 
entails both unconscious abstract representations that experts have acquired through 
experience and explicit representations -- their knowledge of the domain -- which are 
conscious and can be verbalized. Especially in domains like law and medicine, in 
which complex knowledge systems and symbolic representations play an integral 
role, more is involved in making decisions than mere pattern recognition of previous 
similar situations.13 
For example, although a physician may not be aware of all the cognitive processes 
involved, when she evaluates a patient, she is conscious of the patient’s 
characterization of his symptoms, her own diagnosis of the problem, and her requests 
for tests. By overlooking the complex and rich interaction between implicit and 
explicit knowledge, the Dreyfus model fails to explain skills that are not just routines 
but instead involve complex tasks, such as finding solutions to problems. 
Unlike driving a car or riding a bike, handling a legal problem in practice requires 
                                                 
12 Id. at 266. 
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more than intuition based on pattern recognition. Lawyers must juggle, for example, 
the substantive legal doctrine, the procedural context, the particular facts of the 
situation, the client’s needs, and the cultural and social context. The Dreyfus theory 
simply does not address the kinds of complex decision making required in most 
lawyering. Lawyers make decisions at a much more complex conceptual level than 
just recognizing patterns, and real expertise is associated with this higher level. 
Several researchers in the field of medical education have concluded that the 
Dreyfus model is just too simple to account for the complex pattern of phenomena 
linked to expert medical intuition.14  So too should we reach the same conclusion in 
regard to the practice of law. These insights from cognitive science suggest that expert 
lawyers need more than a toolkit of simple rules, protocols, and strategies to facilitate 
pattern recognition. They need to acquire cognitive processes that help them organize 
and juggle the abundance of information pertinent to a case. 
For client interviewing, for example, students need to learn more than general 
scaffolds for developing rapport, gathering information, and probing memory.  They 
need to develop the abilities to identify basic doctrinal issues raised by a client’s 
problem; to consider the interplay between different procedural, substantive, and 
ethical issues raised in the interview; and to understand the difference between 
routine issues in a particular area and more difficult ones that require consultation 
with more experienced practitioners. 
                                                 
14 Id, at 267.   
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Yet the Carnegie story largely ignores these and other essential cognitive 
processes. As a result, experiential education based on that narrative may not provide 
students with the rich experiences necessary to develop as true experts in practice. 
Tale 2:  The Enchanted Standardized Client 
The second story which has gained quite a following in experiential education 
circles is what I call The Enchanted Standardized Client. According to this narrative, 
experiential educators should use standardized client simulations to evaluate lawyer 
performance.15 
The American Best Practices for Legal Education report, for example, glowingly tells 
the story of an experiment using standardized clients at Glasgow Graduate School of 
Law in 2006 to assess student communication skills in interviewing.  In this 
experiment, instructors used eight explicit criteria to evaluate student proficiency in 
interviewing: 
i. Were the greeting and introduction appropriate? 
ii. Did the lawyer listen to the client? 
iii. Did the lawyer use a helpful approach to questioning?  
iv. Did the lawyer accurately summarize the client’s situation? 
v. Did the client understand what the lawyer was saying?  
vi. Did the client feel comfortable with the lawyer? 
vii. Would the client feel comfortable having the lawyer deal with her 
                                                 
15 For a full discussion of the issues raised in this section, see Krieger, supra note 6. 




viii. Would the client come back to this lawyer if she had a new legal 
problem? 
For each of these eight elements, proficiency was assessed on a highly specific 
scale and given a score between 1 and 5. Although such an approach is touted as a 
straight-forward method for assessing student learning, the standardized client story, 
like the Carnegie tale, has very little empirical basis. Advocates for this approach point 
to the use of standardized patients in medical education, but ignore the fact that very 
little study of that method has been conducted in the health sciences field.  
One major study in the medical field, however, suggests that in assessing 
clinical ability, reasoning ability may be at least as important, if not more important, 
as performance. 16   In this study, researchers examined the relationship between 
patient complaints to medical regulatory authorities about the nature of their 
physician’s care and the physician’s previous performance on the Canadian medical 
licensing exam. The research sample included all physicians – over 3,000 doctors -- 
who took the licensing exam between 1993 and 1996 and were licensed to practice in 
Ontario and/or Quebec. 
Researchers then compiled data on all complaints filed with provincial 
regulatory authorities between 1993 and 2005 which were investigated and found to 
                                                 
16 Robyn Tamblyn, Physician Scores on a National Clinical Skills Examination as 
Predictors of Complaints to Medical Regulatory Authorities, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 993 
(2007). 
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be valid. For each physician, they determined complaint rates, derived by dividing 
the number of valid complaints by years of practice time for two different types of 
complaints:  those concerning communication issues and those concerning quality of 
care. Finally, the researchers compared the two different complaint rates with each 
physician’s performance on the various components of the licensing exam. 
One part of the licensing exam assessed medical knowledge using 
approximately 450 multiple-choice questions about different areas of medicine. A 
second component assessed clinical decision-making skills using write-in or menu-
selection response formats on 36 to 40 clinical problems concerning critical aspects of 
diagnosis or management.  Grades on these problems were not based on a single 
correct answer but on the relative quality of the responses regarding critical decisions 
in situations in which errors could affect the patient outcome. The final part was a 
performance-based standardized patient examination which asked candidates to 
interact with simulated patients for five to ten minutes.  Trained physician-observers 
assessed candidates in a number of areas, including data collection (e.g. medical 
history and physical examination) and communication skills (e.g., whether the test-
taker used condescending, offensive, or judgmental behaviors or ignored patient 
responses). 
After examining the data, researchers found that the best predictor of quality-
of-care complaints was the licensing exam’s clinical decision-making component, 
which focused on the cognitive ability of candidates to solve problems. The better the 
test-taker’s score on that part of the exam, the lower the complaint rate for that 
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physician. Although high scores on the communications component of the 
performance exam were not as good a predictor of low quality-of-care complaint rates, 
researchers also found a statistically significant inverse correlation between that 
measure and such rates. In regard to communication complaints, researchers found 
that scores on both the communication part of the performance exam and on the 
clinical decision-making exam served at nearly the same level, as predictors of 
communication complaint rates. 
Finally, researchers surprisingly found a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between overall complaint rates and scores on the multiple-choice test. 
Now, I certainly am not describing this study to you so that you can return to your 
law schools and report that the introductory speaker at a conference on complex legal 
education called for increased use of multiple-choice tests. In fact, the study seems to 
suggest that we should be focusing on teaching students how to problem solve and 
make decisions in practice more than regurgitate information. 
The primary reason I have discussed this research is to raise questions about the 
effectiveness of the use of standardized-clients to assess student development. The 
appeal to teachers of a checklist approach to assessment is not insignificant. This kind 
of method is relatively straightforward and unambiguous in its application, with clear 
goals and criteria for evaluation. Students are also likely to embrace performance-
based assessment. They will be graded favorably if they simply select and apply the 
proper tool from their toolkit of lawyering techniques. 
But in its straightforwardness, the standardized-client approach may detract us 
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from focusing on more significant competencies for long-term practice, such as clinical 
reasoning. This medical study, then, raises significant questions about faddish 
narratives such as the use of standardized client assessment which are enticing in their 
simplicity, but which have little empirical support. 
As Geoff Norman, a researcher on medical education observes, “I fear that in a few 
years the outcomes movement too will emerge as one more educational fad, whose 
major impact was on committee hours reported by academics.  This would be 
unfortunate.  The goal of achieving some kind of uniformity is laudable, but the means 
to the end appear[] too simplistic to be successful.”17 
Tale 3:  The Gospel of Teaching to Learning Styles 
The final narrative that pervades some quarters of experiential education is The 
Gospel of Teaching to Learning Styles. For many years now, skills instructors in the States 
– especially clinicians and legal writing teachers – have enthusiastically preached this 
gospel. 
According to the tale, there are at least five learning styles: (1) verbal; (2) visual; (3) 
oral; (4) aural; and (5) tactile. Different learners process information most efficiently 
through different methods: verbal learners -- through writing and reading written 
texts; visual learners – through pictures, diagrams, and other visual formats; oral – 
through verbal discourse; aural – through listening; and tactile – through doing. 
                                                 
17 Geoff Norman, Editorial – Outcomes, Objectives, and the Seductive Appeal of Simple Solutions, 11 
ADVANCES IN HEALTH SCI. EDUC. 217, 219 (2006). 
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The preachers of this gospel acknowledge right up front that students generally 
rely to a greater or lesser degree on most, if not all five, methods. But they go one step 
farther:  according to their story, instruction -- to some extent -- should be tailored to 
a student’s learning style.  Individual learning styles should be assessed, and 
instruction should be focused on that style. 
The Best Practices Report recommends, for example, that law schools create faculty-
supervised learning centers to provide academic support for students.  These centers, 
the Report contends, would assist all learners as individuals to make demonstrable 
progress at their own pace taking their learning styles into account without stigma. 
And the literature is replete with exhortations such as this one from a clinical teacher 
at a prominent clinical program, “[R]eaching a learner through his or her preferred 
learning mode can have a substantial positive effect on learning efficiency and 
outcomes for that student.  When designing an effective learning-friendly classroom 
community, professors can draw upon these understandings of preferred learning 
modes.”18 
Unfortunately, however, the preachers of the Learning Style Gospel have not taken 
a hard look at the recent empirical evidence about tailoring instruction to learning 
styles. In fact, that evidence, calls into question the accuracy of this story.  A recent 
article in the journal Medical Education reviewed the extensive literature on learning 
                                                 
18 Kate E. Bloch, Cognition and Star Trek:  Learning and Legal Education, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 959, 968 
(2009). 
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styles and concluded, “[A] thoughtful review of the data provides no support for 
style-based instruction.” 19   Research has shown that people, when asked, will 
volunteer preferences about their preferred mode of taking in new information and 
studying.  Such preferences, however, do not demonstrate that assessing a student’s 
learning style would be helpful in assessing the most effective mode of instruction for 
that student. 
The authors of that Medical Education article observe that the only research design 
that would support style-based teaching would require the evaluation of the outcomes 
from different instruction using different modes of instruction.  Specifically, an 
appropriately-designed study would require that subjects be divided into two 
different groups (for example, visual and verbal) based on a learning styles test; the 
subjects would be randomly assigned to instruction in the different modes so that one-
half of each group would receive the right mode of instruction and half would receive 
the wrong mode; and all the subjects would then be given a test for assessment. These 
researchers found that only a relatively few studies used this methodology, and most 
of them that did showed no correlation between the subject’s performance on the 
assessment test and a subject’s instruction in her preferred learning mode. The authors 
conclude, “[T]here presently is no empirical justification for tailoring instruction to 
students’ supposedly different learning styles.  Educators should instead focus on the 
most effective and coherent ways to present particular bodies of content.” 
                                                 
19 Doug Rohrer & Harold Pashler, Learning Styles:  Where’s the Evidence, 46 MED. EDUC. 630 (2012). 
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So here with the Gospel of Learning Styles we have another popular story in the 
experiential education library that – under close inspection – is not  quite as significant 
as its narrators try to make it. 
Again, I want to be clear that I am not contending that there is no such thing as 
different learning styles or that, when possible, a teacher should try to use different 
modes of instruction. In fact, the researchers who have conducted these critical 
reviews of learning style literature uniformly suggest that different modes can be 
helpful if the content taught can effectively be taught with that approach.  My only 
point is that before we get on the tailored-learning-style bandwagon, we need to 
seriously consider the validity of the research underlying that narrative.  Before law 
schools expend substantial funds on learning centers focused on individual learning 
styles or instructors use their limited course time to testing of individual learning 
style, we need some critical inquiry of the subject. 
Where do we go from here? 
These stories -- The Practical Apprenticeship Model:  the Vehicle for 21st Century Legal 
Education, the Enchanted Standardized Client, and Learning Style Gospel are just three of 
the popular narratives that dominate many discussions in the field of experiential 
education. 
Unfortunately, there are other similar stories. In classic persuasion mode, these 
tales are used to validate our pedagogy and approaches to legal education. But, for 
the most part, they are not the subject to critical inquiry or discussion.  These 
narratives may have some validity, but most scholars in the field have shied away 
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from approaching them with the lenses of inquiring mode. 
So how do we do that?  I would like to spend the remainder of my presentation 
describing some proposals on how we can use inquiring mode to approach Complex 
Legal Education – Knowledge, Skills, and Values.  
First, I suggest that we need to subject our pedagogy and teaching models to 
evidence-based scrutiny. Unlike researchers in other fields such as medical education, 
scholars in legal education have substituted empirical examination of their work with 
arguments and theories based on the authors’ own experience in the classroom. 
Perhaps, it is in our DNA.  As lawyers, most of us would rather argue positions rather 
than openly explore issues.  We do not have the scientific bent of physicians. 
Most scholarship on complex legal education has been no different.  In large part, 
it is based solely on anecdotal experiences in the classroom or clinic or on informal 
surveys of students in skills courses.  Nice stories; but too little critical inquiry. The 
purportedly momentous Carnegie Report on American legal education, for instance, 
based most of its assertions about the role of clinical education in law schools on an 
informal survey of clinical programs at several different law schools. In selecting these 
schools and analyzing the data, the authors of the report used no methodological 
controls.  Accordingly, they have provided us with no basis for assessing the validity 
of their findings. 
Skills teachers, myself included, are quite gratified by the positive feedback we 
receive from our students who consistently repeat the mantra,”Your course is one of 
the only classes in law school where I did something practical!” But such 
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acknowledgements or student satisfaction surveys, such as the American Law School 
Survey of Student Engagement (“LSSSE”), are not substitutes for a hard look at 
teaching methods. They simply do not tell us whether our pedagogy – in the long run 
– will transfer into effective representation of clients in practice. 
What I believe we need to do is approach our research in an inquiring mode with 
an open mind, not to “prove” a particular theory or validate a pet method for training 
students.  Rather, we should attempt to learn as much as possible about the subject to 
develop inferences and explanations about it. 
A whole array of subjects in the area of complex legal education are out there that 
are ripe for empirical study: a) the relative effectiveness of different instruction models 
-- live-client clinics; simulation courses; and externships -- in training students in 
particular skills; b) the impact of different modes of instruction -- large-group lectures, 
seminars, role plays -- on development of specific skills; c)  the effectiveness of 
computer-based learning in complex legal instruction; d) the efficacy of early 
lawyering skills courses in laying a foundation for later skills training; e)   the 
effectiveness of different methods of outcome assessment for evaluating student 
performance; and f)  the long-term impact of clinic courses on attorneys in practice.  
And there are many other issues I am sure you can identify. I suggest that throughout 
this conference, we consider issues which we can empirically test. 
Now I can read the thought bubbles over your heads responding to this proposal:  
“It’s impossible to test with any accuracy most, if not all, of the issues you’ve 
identified.  Complex legal education is simply too complex to subject to empirical 
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scrutiny.” While this concern is quite legitimate, I do not think that it undermines -- 
in any significant way – the benefits of such inquiry. No, we are not going to be able 
to run the kinds of large subject quantitative studies used in some medical research. 
But we can use the rigorous methods developed for small sample size qualitative 
research that can start to give us some insights into the questions we wish to study. 
We can design such valid research by: i) the crafting of concrete and narrow 
hypotheses; ii) the development – even with small sample sizes -- of selection criteria 
for subjects which attempt to eliminate bias; iii) the use of a methodology, such as 
video recording or document capturing software, which assures the collection of the 
full array of data; and iv) the development of valid and reliable rules – explicit coding 
protocols- - for measurement of the data collected. 
Moreover, the validity of this type of research can be enhanced by replication and 
sharing of data.  The methods of qualitative empirical study require transparency in 
the research process.  Researchers disclose all the steps of their studies:  hypothesis 
generation; subject selection criteria; methodology; and measurement protocols.  And 
after they publish their studies, they post their data on websites accessible to other 
researchers.  In this way, other scholars have the ability to review and critique the 
research methods and to conduct their own analysis of the data.  They also have the 
ability to tweak the methodology and attempt to replicate the study.  Research, then, 
becomes a social enterprise, in which multiple researchers are not just telling their 
discrete stories about a subject but building on the work of others. 
Second, I propose that we collaborate much more extensively with colleagues in 
REFLECTION – TEACHING AND LEARNING IN CLINIC 
275 
 
other disciplines who are exploring similar complex educational issues.  Researchers, 
especially in the area of health sciences, have been studying issues of professional 
education for decades.  We are far behind them, and we can learn a lot from them.  I 
could not have done my own empirical and theoretical research on student legal 
reasoning without the significant assistance of faculty members at Columbia Medical 
School’s Department of Biomedical Informatics. 
A few years ago, after I published a piece on the role of domain knowledge in 
teaching legal problem solving, a law professor at another school was highly critical 
of my conclusions.  I suggested that we develop a study together to test our divergent 
hypotheses.  He declined my offer candidly telling me that empirical research is 
simply just too time-consuming.  While such research may be very labor intensive, at 
least in my opinion, that factor is not an adequate excuse for rejecting empirical 
scrutiny of our work. 
By working with researchers in other fields, some of the labor intensive aspects of 
empirical research can be alleviated.  They can help us frame hypotheses and develop 
research methodologies.  Many of the issues we are now tackling have been the subject 
of research in other fields.  These studies can be used to frame our own research.  For 
example, medical educators have conducted numerous studies of the issue of the use 
of simulated versus actual patients in clinical instruction.  And the issue of learning 
transfer – using a concept learned in one context to solve a problem in a different 
context – is now a very hot topic for research in a number of areas of educational 
psychology.  With necessary revisions, we can attempt to replicate this research. 
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Researchers in other disciplines can also train us in the methodology of qualitative 
empirical research.  The Columbia faculty, for example, have helped train my own 
research assistants in the use of the think-aloud protocol for interviewing law school 
subjects in my studies on legal reasoning.  And in a study which I am currently 
conducting with a colleague on the different reasoning strategies of students using 
print versus electronic media, a colleague in Hofstra’s Sociology Department is 
assisting us in using advanced statistical software to analyze the data.20 
Additionally, colleagues in other fields can give us a deeper understanding of the 
theories and approaches in other disciplines than we can gather from reading one or 
two articles.  I am the first to admit that empirical research is not the be-all-and-end-
all of critical inquiry of our field. 
Serious study of the relevant theoretical literature in other fields can also be quite 
productive.  Far too often, however, legal scholars will discover a particular social, 
psychological, or educational theory and latch onto it, without a full grasp of the place 
of that theory in the discipline or critiques of its validity, and present it as accepted 
dogma.  Apparently, that is what happened with the Carnegie Report in which the 
authors focused solely on the Dreyfus theory of expertise without considering the 
contradictory evidence and theories in the cognitive science literature.  Researchers in 
other disciplines can provide us a more nuanced grasp of the present state of thinking 
                                                 
20 Subsequent to this conference, this study was published.  See Stefan H. Krieger & Katrina Fischer 
Kuh, Accessing the Law:  An Empirical Study Exploring the Influence of Legal Research Medium, 16 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 757 (2014). 
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in those fields and introduce us to all the important literature on a subject. 
In a similar vein, colleagues in other fields can help us to tamp down our tendency to 
slide into persuasion mode.  Several times in reviewing drafts of my articles describing 
my empirical studies, my colleagues at Columbia have cautioned that my data do not 
fully support some of my extravagant conclusions.  They have helped me to 
understand that any one study is only one piece of the puzzle, and that other research 
– by me and others – will over time provide a fuller picture. 
Finally, I propose that we reach out to other colleagues in our law schools – especially 
those who are critical or skeptical of experiential education – to collaborate on studies 
of effective pedagogy.  Even after all the decades in which clinical and skills teaching 
have been part of the curriculum, there is still a divide between “them” and “us.”  In 
my own experience, I have seen that phenomenon even in schools that have a strong 
tradition of skills education.   And it is not just the nonclinical teachers who have this 
superiority complex that their teaching is deeper and more significant.  Often 
clinicians will confide among themselves that students are getting their only real 
training in clinics. 
At least in my opinion, if legal education is going to improve significantly, our studies 
of teaching methods and pedagogy should not be limited to assessing experiential 
education.  We need to explore the entire enterprise of legal education.  As the 
Canadian study of performance in practice suggests, there are benefits in complex 
professional education from both traditional doctrinal study and clinical fieldwork.  
And it may not be as simple as the Carnegie Report suggests, as having a first year 
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devoted to study of basic legal reasoning and final years devoted primarily to skills 
training. 
We need to persuade our colleagues to work with us to develop studies to test the 
relative effectiveness of different teaching methods and approaches.  Both groups 
need to recognize that arguments in persuasion mode about the relative benefits of 
different teaching methods are not going to resolve the matter.  And both need to 
approach this research with open minds willing to accept results that are counter to 
their present positions. 
Conclusion 
After all this criticism of the scholarship on complex legal education, some of you may 
be wondering whether I am going to conclude this presentation questioning the merits 
of my more than three decades as a clinical teacher. 
But that is far from the case. 
While I might not have substantial empirical support for my beliefs, I do feel that 
clinical education has had significant benefits for my students and thousands of others 
over the past half a century.  I acknowledge that much of this feeling is based primarily 
on stories, but when I talk to graduates twenty or thirty years out of law school and 
hear tales of the value of clinics on them even today, I know we had some real effect. 
But, at the same time, I am worried that we will complacently continue – much like 
our nonclinical colleagues – to rely on stories to support our work rather than critical 
inquiry. 
I certainly understand the risks of our questioning the effectiveness of our teaching 
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methods.  While experiential legal educators have come a long way, at a vast majority 
of schools, our status is still less secure than doctrinal faculty.  If we follow the path I 
suggest, we may be giving our critics ammunition to use against us. 
But if our goal is to improve our teaching, better train our students, and provide 
quality representation for clients, I, for one, believe the risk is worth it.  We need to 
show our critics that we are confident enough in our pedagogy that we will not shy 
away from rigorously assessing it. 
  When I look at the alternative stories of the establishment of the Palacký Clinic, 
I have to say I like the second one much better.  It is not a heroic tale.  It highlights the 
limitations of both the faculties at Hofstra and Palacký.  But in so doing, it helps us -- 
so much better than the first narrative -- to explore what we can learn about the 
establishment of clinical education in newly-developed democracies and the nature of 
experiential education.  In fact, given the present success of the Palacký Clinic, that 
story may be a good lesson for us about the need for slow, grassroot development of 
clinics rather than close direction by experts from abroad. 
I hope that throughout this conference, we do share our stories of our successes in our 
field.  But I also hope that we do not shy away from identifying our failures, problems, 
and doubts. 
Most importantly, I hope we can consider ways of collaborating in the future to reflect 
critically on the important issues now facing complex legal education. 
 
 
